Introduction

In 2001, the public overwhelmingly approved a constitution through a national referendum. The Constitution mandates the election of the President, members of the bicameral Parliament, regional councillors, and local councillors.

Article 9 of the constitution establishes political parties, limiting their number to three, and provides the constitutional and legal framework under which parties are formed and elections are conducted. The three-party constitutional limit itself is problematic, as it weakens competition and internal democracy, but it is also contrary to the very concept of a multiparty system. It is an issue that warrants specific, focused analysis.

It is largely due to the failure of political parties, whose very relevance is increasingly in question, that people have turned to clans as a form of political organisation. When formal institutions become incapable of fulfilling their roles, alternative structures often emerge to fill the gap. This was what happened in 1991, when the collapse of Somalia's central government led clans and their leaders to assume leadership roles. As a result, Somaliland’s peacebuilding and state-building processes in the 1990s were predominantly clan-led.

This opinion discusses the role and dominance of clans in Somaliland’s politics at the expense of political parties.

2010 and after: the decline of party politics in Somaliland

During the transition to one-person, one-vote in the early 2000s, there was an expectation that the system would gradually move away from clan dominance. The early elections (2002, 2003, and 2005) were indeed less rooted in clan affiliations compared to the electoral phase that began in 2010. However, from 2010 onwards, politicians competing for office increasingly relied on clans, sidelining political parties. Clans began to function as de facto political platforms, conducting informal "primaries” to select candidates for parliamentary and local council elections, and forming alliances to support presidential contenders.

The post-2010 Somaliland democratic process is characterised by rising electoral competition and campaign expenses, leading candidates to rely on clan financing and support, due to the lack of laws and institutions regulating campaign funding. 

The coalition that unseated President Dahir Rayale (2003-2010) in 2010 was largely based on clan affiliation and, as a result, it became beholden to clans. It can also be argued that there is a generational shift in politics; a transition from liberation era politicians, who were mostly motivated by a desire to establish stability and had recent memories of war, to a new generation of politicians motivated by competitive patronage politics. In the absence of political parties founded on ideological lines, personal ambition and interest revolve around party activities and outlook. 

The Hargeisa mayoral contest: when clans eclipse political parties

The competition between clans as political actors and political parties appears to have reached a settled conclusion: clans now dominate parties. This reality was evident in Hargeisa last week, where clan members convened to select a single mayoral candidate from among two competing council members belonging to the same clan. Their objective was clear: to maximise the chances of their candidate’s success. One candidate was chosen, and the other agreed to step aside. A few nights earlier, the opposing camp followed a similar approach.

The mayoral race has thus effectively become a contest between clans. Yet the councillors who will elect the next mayor, replacing the current officeholder who has promised to resign, were themselves elected on political party platforms, albeit largely along sub-clan lines. This means the political parties appear to play no meaningful role in determining the leadership of one of Somaliland's most important offices.

The upcoming Hargeisa mayoral election highlights the vital significance of effective political parties. Without them, the influence of clans as political entities becomes a destabilising force. Clan-based politics often leads to deep divisions, especially when there are no strong party structures to manage competition and foster broader political unity. The discourse is dominated by the rhetoric of hatred and calls for clan violence. 

Although it is unrealistic to expect a complete separation of clans and politics in Somaliland in the near future, the weakness or absence of political parties has led to near-total dominance by clan-based dynamics.

Marginalisation resulting from clan politics

The increasing influence of clan leaders in politics has contributed to the continued underrepresentation of women. For instance, only 4% of the 241 officials appointed by the President since he assumed office in December 2024 are women. One contributing factor, though not the only one, is the President’s heavy reliance on political brokers when making appointments. These brokers often play a decisive role in recommending candidates.

Corruption

Another harmful consequence of clan dominance is the erosion of merit-based appointments. Instead of competence, officials are often selected based on their loyalty to powerful intermediaries, typically male clan leaders and wealthy actors.

Corruption is increasingly perceived as endemic. What social media users refer to as "G+1”, a reference to the first floor of newly built, expensive houses owned by government officials, has become a widely discussed symbol of unexplained wealth.

Many of these officials, having been appointed through patronage rather than merit, remain indebted to their backers and uncertain about their future. Some had no stable livelihoods prior to their appointments. This combination of obligation and insecurity creates strong incentives for rent-seeking and misuse of public resources. Anti-corruption mechanisms remain weak or largely ineffective.

Conclusion

The Hargeisa mayoral competition is not an isolated episode. It is a reflection of a broader structural reality in Somaliland’s political system. The gradual weakening of political parties has allowed clans to assume the role of the primary vehicles of political organisation and competition. While clans historically played a stabilising role, particularly during the state-building period of the 1990s, their dominance within a constitutional, multiparty framework has produced unintended and increasingly harmful consequences.

The effects are visible: the marginalisation of women, the erosion of merit-based appointments, and the growing perception of corruption as a systemic feature rather than an exception. When political authority is mediated through informal networks of loyalty and patronage, public institutions risk becoming instruments of private obligation rather than vehicles of public service.

The Somaliland Constitution envisages a political order anchored in political parties, electoral accountability, and institutional governance. However, without functioning and credible parties capable of aggregating interests beyond clan lines, this framework remains only partially realised. The persistence of clan dominance is therefore not merely a cultural phenomenon, but a symptom of institutional weakness.

The challenge is not to eliminate clans from politics, an unrealistic goal in the near term, but to rebalance the system by strengthening political parties and formal institutions. This includes enforcing internal party democracy, promoting merit-based appointments, and establishing credible anti-corruption mechanisms. Without such reforms, the gap between the constitutional vision and political practice will continue to widen, with significant implications for governance, social cohesion, and the long-term stability of Somaliland.

Guleid Ahmed Jama

Lawyer based in Hargiesa, Somaliland.

X: @GuleidJ